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WELFARE STANDARDS IN U.S. AND E.U. 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Roger D. Blair* & D. Daniel Sokol** 
 
The potential goals of antitrust are numerous.  Goals matter to antitrust.  
We believe that it is total welfare rather than consumer welfare that should 
drive antitrust analysis.  We use this Article as an opportunity to explore 
both a comparative analysis of welfare standards across E.U. and U.S. 
competition systems and the impact of welfare standards on global antitrust 
systemwide welfare.   
In this Article, we analyze two types of situations in which there would be 
a different outcome based on the goal implemented.  One scenario involves 
resale price maintenance (RPM).  For RPM, we argue that even if there 
were a different welfare standard across jurisdictions as between Europe 
and the United States, in practice, it would have very little global impact.  
The second scenario involves merger control.  We analyze a divergence in 
welfare standards between merger regimes where the use of efficiencies 
might play out differently across Europe and the United States depending 
on the welfare standard used.  Under this second scenario, the welfare 
standard matters globally as to business outcomes in a way in which it does 
not under the first scenario. If one major merger regime blocks the merger, 
it effectively blocks the merger globally. Finally, we provide our concluding 
thoughts on the future and desirability of convergence around total welfare 
as the sole goal in the practice of competition economics globally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Goals matter to antitrust.1  While proponents of antitrust (in the United 
States) and competition law (most of the rest of the world) may have had 
multiple goals when initially enacting legislation,2 two goals predominate 
modern academic and policy discourse:  total welfare (the overall surplus 
from producers and consumers) and consumer welfare (the surplus only 
from consumers).3  Much of the time these goals are indistinguishable in 
practice, because behavior that violates antitrust law often reduces both 
consumer and total welfare.  However, there are certain situations in which 
the behavior in question violates only one of these goals.  In those 
situations, the goal selected matters to the execution of antitrust law, 
particularly when there are not per se legal rules regarding legality or 
illegality.4 
 
 1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50 
(1978).  Ambiguity about the goals (a distinction between rules and standards) or 
inconsistency among goals may be costly.  Indeed, divergence among standards across 
countries is costly, and we believe that total surplus is the superior standard. 
 2. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY REPORT 
(2002), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc
358.pdf (“[O]bjectives of competition laws vary widely from one jurisdiction to another . . . .  
[P]arallel objectives, possibly conflicting with that of economic efficiency or consumer 
welfare, are present in many competition laws.”). 
 3. We note that there is a difference between welfare and surplus, but we use the term 
“welfare” as shorthand throughout this Article because the debate has been framed as 
between consumer welfare and total welfare.  For a discussion of the difference between 
welfare and surplus, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2010). 
 4. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of 
Antitrust:  An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 498–502 (2012) (providing 
examples of joint ventures, mergers, bilateral monopolies, physician cooperative bargaining, 
all-or-none offers, two part pricing, and bid rigging in English auctions, in which a different 
welfare standard may lead to divergent outcomes for the same type of behavior). 
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As we have argued elsewhere,5 we believe that it is total welfare rather 
than consumer welfare that should drive antitrust analysis.  This is not a 
new position within antitrust scholarship.  Indeed, it seems to be the 
dominant one.6  Under a total welfare standard, any behavior that reduces 
total welfare would be deemed unlawful, whereas any behavior that does 
not would be lawful. 
As part of the total welfare analysis, we utilize the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation principle to assess the impact that various practices would 
have on total welfare.7  The strength of Kaldor-Hicks is its ability to 
provide an economically sound methodology for separating objectionable 
and unobjectionable business behavior.  For example, a merger may be 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the winner (the monopolist) is able to compensate 
the loser (consumers) and still have profits left over.8 
Welfare standards within antitrust have been studied in great depth 
within a single jurisdictional setting.9  Most of the time, the battle over 
welfare standards has been overblown, and there is no difference in 
outcome.  We use this Article as an opportunity to explore both a 
 
 5. See generally id. 
 6. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 50; MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY:  
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001); 
Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need To Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (2007); 
Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust:  Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What 
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The 
Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2006); Ken 
Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L 29 (2006); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act:  How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should 
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010). 
 7. See RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY:  A 
PRACTICAL APPROVAL TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 32–38 (2004) (discussing the 
Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle); see also J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare 
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economic and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 8. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 4, at 483–89. 
 9. Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics:  Perspectives on the Goals and Future 
of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175 (2013); Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of 
Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279 (2013); Harry First & Spencer Weber 
Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013); Eleanor M. Fox, 
Against Goals 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing 
Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2013); David A. Hyman & William 
E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2163 (2013); John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust:  Protecting 
Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 
(2013); Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:  
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2349 (2013); Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and 
Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its 
Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013); Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and 
Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2647 (2013); Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2575 (2013); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of 
Antitrust:  Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405 (2013). 
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comparative analysis of welfare standards across E.U. and U.S. competition 
systems10 and the impact of welfare standards on global antitrust 
systemwide welfare.  This analysis provides an opportunity to discuss 
situations in which the difference between different standards—consumer 
versus total welfare versus non-antitrust political factors—may lead to 
disparate outcomes.11  The analysis’s comparative element is distinct from 
its international element in that a difference across antitrust systems may 
have a global impact.  When there is a disagreement across antitrust 
regimes as to welfare standards that have global impact, there may be, for 
example, behavior that is forbidden even when it enhances total welfare 
globally and should be permitted based upon the strictest major antitrust 
jurisdiction to review the merger.  This is only a small set of situations, 
most notably efficiencies in a merger or joint venture context.  Most of the 
time, the welfare standard does not matter.12 
In any discussion across legal systems about the goals of antitrust, one 
must ask if there is substantive convergence, and if there is, is it a good 
thing.  The answer to the first question is both yes and no.  There is some 
global substantive convergence around the goals of antitrust.  We believe 
that this convergence is happening around a narrow competition economics 
vision of the goals of antitrust, as we explore in Part I. 
The process of antitrust convergence across countries is not easy.13  
Institutional structures are a function of both the time in which they were 
set up and the institutional development based upon this initial 
endowment.14  This creates path dependence to institutional development 
that makes the integration of new learning more difficult for some antitrust 
 
 10. Most recently summarized across the United States, Canada, Europe, and China in 
Pingping Shan et al., China’s Anti-monopoly Law:  What Is the Welfare Standard?, 41 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 31 (2012). 
 11. For a general conceptualization of regulatory competition, see Francesco Parisi et al., 
Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 56 (2006). 
 12. Indeed, numerous articles suggest that maximizing consumer welfare will bring 
antitrust closer to total welfare. See, e.g., Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus 
Defense in Merger Control, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 287 (Vivek Ghosal 
& Johan Stennek eds., 2007); Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Consumer Surplus 
vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 829 (2005), available at http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/tropeano/pdf/polconc/artciles
0607/nevenrollersurplus.pdf; Bruce R. Lyons, Could Politicians Be More Right Than 
Economists?  A Theory of Merger Standards (Ctr. for Competition & Regulation, Revised 
Working Paper No. CCR02-1, 2002), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/
1.104451!ccr02-1revised.pdf. 
 13. See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 
911, 913–15 (2003) (explaining soft convergence in antitrust); D. Daniel Sokol, 
International Antitrust Institutions, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 187 
(Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) (suggesting the areas in which soft law antitrust convergence 
are possible). 
 14. See William E. Kovacic, Creating Competition Policy:  Betty Bock and the 
Development of Antitrust Institutions, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 244–45 (1997); William E. 
Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in 
Transitional Economies:  Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995). 
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systems (primarily agencies and courts) than others.15  Different path 
dependencies complicate the possibility of convergence across systems for 
any potential singular goal of antitrust.   
Consequently, a number of factors are at play regarding antitrust 
convergence.  Law matters,16 macro level political economy factors 
matter,17 as do the quality and ability of courts and agencies to shape 
doctrine into policy.18  In the European Union and United States 
comparison, a number of developments in the U.S. institutional framework 
are different from those of Europe.  They include private treble damages,19 
a robust system of class actions,20 and a judicial-based enforcement system 
(unlike the European administrative-based competition system).21  Private 
remedies do not exist in a meaningful way in Europe, which might explain 
stronger E.U. remedies by government enforcement22 if one assumes that 
total enforcement (public and private) should be roughly the same between 
the two jurisdictions.23 
Other factors also shape the institutional path dependency of antitrust.  
To a certain extent, it is history and politics, rather than efficiency, that 
explain divergent antitrust systems, although economics’ application to 
antitrust also plays a role.24  For example, many of the assumptions in the 
 
 15. D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1055 (2010) (describing institutional analysis within antitrust). 
 16. Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World:  An Empirical Analysis of 
the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 276–81 (2007). 
 17. Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy:  The Unique Enforcement 
Challenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2009); 
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition 
Economies:  The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 265 (2001). 
 18. D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust 
Agency Capacity, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1081 (2009); William E. Kovacic et al., How Does 
Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETITION L.J. 25 (2011). 
 19. Stephen W. Salant, Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing, 
95 J. POL. ECON. 1326, 1327 (1987). 
 20. John H. Johnson & Gregory K. Leonard, Economics and the Rigorous Analysis of 
Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 341 (2007); William H. 
Page, Introduction:  Reexamining the Standards for Certification of Antitrust Class Actions, 
21 ANTITRUST 53 (2007). 
 21. Thomas C. Arthur, Competition Law and Development:  Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2013); Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition 
Authorities:  The Institutional Limits of Antitrust, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION 
LAW 141 (Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012). 
 22. See Per Hellström et al., Remedies in European Antitrust Law, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 
43, 58 (2009) (discussing E.U. remedies). 
 23. On the discussion of the relationship between public and private antitrust 
enforcement see, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, Private Information and the Deterrent 
Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 386 (1988); David Besanko 
& Daniel F. Spulber, Are Treble Damages Neutral?  Sequential Equilibrium and Private 
Antitrust Enforcement, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 870, 883 (1990). 
 24. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION:  LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 
(2010); DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:  
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998); Arthur, supra note 21.  There is a similar discussion in 
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United States and its antitrust system—with a history of limited government 
regulation and a dearth of state ownership—do not provide a direct analogy 
to the competition regimes in Europe, which had more state intervention.  
European competition law also has specific provisions regarding state aid25 
(subsidies) and provisions specific to public undertakings.26 
An additional policy, unique to the supranational nature of the European 
Union, adds richness to European competition law goals.  The initial focus 
of the European competition system and European Union overall was to 
integrate the economies of the member states.  Moreover, competition 
policy in Europe has had a more distributive flavor than its American 
counterpart.  There has been far more concern in European case law about 
choices for consumers,27 even if preserving choice has translated into 
enforcement policies that disfavor more efficient competitors.28 
We recognize that institutions vary and that the current set of institutions 
both within the United States and European Union (let alone other 
competition systems) are not easily calibrated to ensure that total welfare 
could be utilized as the singular value of antitrust/competition law.  Indeed, 
if anything, it seems to be consumer welfare that is the standard on which 
there is increasing international convergence.  However, the purpose of this 
Article is to note that, because of the misalignment of institutional 
capabilities and goals, certain fault lines emerge between competing 
economic goals of antitrust as well as between political and economic 
goals.  We articulate where these fault lines are currently.  We also note 
 
corporate law regarding comparative corporate governance systems. See MARK J. ROE, 
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:  THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1994) (describing a political and historic view of what shapes corporate 
governance in the United States); Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing but Wind”?  The Past and 
Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2011) (providing an 
overview of comparative corporate governance scholarship); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, 
Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) (explaining comparative 
corporate governance through political economy and historical factors); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997) (discussing 
how law matters to corporate governance). 
 25. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
107, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 91 [hereinafter TFEU] (limiting “any aid granted by a 
Member State . . . in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”).  For 
analysis, see KELYN BACON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF STATE AID (2d ed. forthcoming 
2013). 
 26. TFEU art. 106; see also Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751, ¶ 79; Case C-49/07, MOTOE v. 
Elliniko Dimosio, 2008 E.C.R. I-4863, ¶ 25; Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 & 
C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband v. IchthyolGesellschaft Cordes, 2004 E.C.R. I-2493, ¶ 58.  
For academic treatment see, for example, Okeoghene Odudu, Are State-Owned Health-Care 
Providers Undertakings Subject to Competition Law?, 5 E.C.L.R. 231 (2011). 
 27. See Paul Nihoul, Freedom of Choice—The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in 
European Competition Law (June 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2077694. 
 28. See William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence:  The Boeing–McDonnell 
Douglas Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001). 
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particular situations in which a divergence of welfare standards either 
matters or does not matter globally.29 
This Article analyzes the United States and European Union because at 
present, global antitrust is bipolar.  That is, a global business strategy that 
one of the U.S. antitrust agencies or the European Commission (EC) 
successfully challenges may have global repercussions and may spell the 
end to such a strategy in ways that would not be true if other jurisdictions 
were to challenge a global deal.  Future growth of Chinese and possibly 
Indian economic power may impact the antitrust setting.30  The result may 
be the creation of a multipolar world of antitrust for which a successful 
agency action by either the United States, Europe, India, or China may 
derail a business strategy whether it be via conduct or merger.31 
Part I of this Article discusses the importance of the development of 
economic analysis in U.S. and E.U. competition law to better explain how 
the choice of an economic welfare standard has fundamentally become the 
choice of a goal for antitrust/competition law.  This discussion sets up our 
substantive analysis of goals, where we analyze two types of situations in 
which there would be a different outcome based on the goal implemented.  
In Part II, we discuss the first scenario.  This scenario involves resale price 
maintenance (RPM).  For RPM, we argue that even if there were a different 
welfare standard across jurisdictions, it would have very little global 
impact.  In Part III, we analyze the question of different global standards 
with regards to merger control.  In this second scenario, we analyze a 
difference in welfare standards between merger regimes where the use of 
efficiencies might play out differently between the European Union and the 
United States depending on the welfare standard used.  Under this second 
scenario, the welfare standard matters globally as to business outcomes in a 
way that it does not under the first scenario.  If one major merger regime 
blocks the merger, it effectively blocks the merger globally.32  Part IV 
 
 29. Conceptually, total welfare of a given country actually means the sum of consumer 
surplus and domestic firms’ profits. See, e.g., Pedro P. Barros & Luís Cabral, Merger Policy 
in Open Economies, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 1041 (1994).  If, however, the consumer welfare 
standard is adopted, then all firms should be treated equally. 
 30. See D. Daniel Sokol & William Blumenthal, Merger Control:  Key International 
Norms and Differences, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 319 
(Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012). 
 31. On antitrust developments in India, see Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New 
Competition Law:  A Comparative Assessment, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 609 (2008); 
Rahul Singh, India’s Tryst with “The Clayton Act Moment” and Emerging Merger Control 
Jurisprudence:  Intersection of Law, Economics and Politics, in COMPETITION LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 21.  On China, see, for example, Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao, 
Merger Control Policy Under China’s Anti-monopoly Law, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 109 
(2012); Shan, supra note 10, at 31. 
 32. See Sokol, supra note 15, at 1094 (“On an international level, a key concern is when 
one of the major powers in antitrust, the European Union or the United States, has a lower 
standard for a finding of wrongdoing than other countries.  The lower standard effectively 
operates as the global standard because remedies often have global implications.”); 
D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders:  The Institutional Challenge of International 
Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 62 (2007) (“A single country 
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provides our concluding thoughts on the future and desirability of 
convergence around total welfare as the sole goal in the practice of 
competition economics globally. 
I.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST VERSUS OTHER GOALS AND 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This part explores the importance of goals in the implementation of 
antitrust law and policy.  It begins with an overview of the different types of 
goals in antitrust.  It then examines the shifts in goals over time in both the 
United States and Europe.  In the long run, antitrust goals have narrowed to 
ones based on industrial organization economics.  This is without question 
the current state of play in the United States.  In Europe, the shift to 
industrial organization economics based goals is less well developed.  
A.  Goals 
The potential goals of antitrust are numerous.  Moreover, the goals of 
antitrust in any given antitrust system may change over time.33  A current 
snapshot of the different goals of the International Competition Network 
(ICN) members shows the diversity and, at times, overlapping or 
conflicting nature of the goals of antitrust.  These goals include:  ensuring 
an effective competitive process, promoting consumer welfare, enhancing 
efficiency, ensuring economic freedom, ensuring a level playing field for 
small and mid-sized enterprises, promoting fairness and equality, promoting 
consumer choice, achieving market integration, facilitating privatization 
and market liberalization, and promoting competitiveness in international 
markets.34 
Noneconomic goals may play a role in some antitrust regimes.  This 
discussion is similar to the choice of goals in economic regulation 
generally.  There may be other areas of economic regulation in which other 
legitimate factors get included in the goal.  Regulation frequently seeks to 
address issues relating to externalities, health and safety, industrial policy, 
 
can hold up consummation of a merger, adding significant costs to or even scuttling the 
proposed deal entirely.”).  On the economics of international antitrust, see Oliver Budzinski, 
International Antitrust Institutions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., expected 2013). 
 33. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1; Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust:  A 
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182 (1981); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive 
Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Robert H. Lande, Wealth 
Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation 
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1999); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of 
Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:  THE 
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 
2008). 
 34. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL 
CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-
CREATED MONOPOLIES 38 (2007), available at http://www.internationalcompetition
network.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf. 
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distributive justice, or financial stability among others.35  At times, some of 
the goals are prone to risk of capture and present problems familiar within 
the public choice literature.36  It is just that these other regulatory goals are 
not considered in an industrial organization antitrust analysis, nor do we 
think that they should be. 
We believe that there are better mechanisms for achieving distributive 
effects than antitrust.  By distributive goals within antitrust, we mean either 
distributive goals via the implementation of a consumer welfare standard or 
through justifications that are not economics based within antitrust law.  
Other mechanisms for distributive concerns, such as taxation, would be 
more effective.37  As for the achievement of multiple goals that include the 
promotion of competition concurrently with goals that may be pursued 
through sector regulation, we believe that sector regulation is better suited 
to address political tradeoffs because of its broader goals, such as “public 
interest,” than is antitrust.38  
Antitrust, as practiced in the modern, advanced jurisdictions, is more 
predictable and better able to produce welfare-enhancing results than a 
system based upon public interest concerns, in which interest group clashes 
may predominate.  This economic effects based form of antitrust is antitrust 
technocracy.39  We prefer that the antitrust system be technocratic in the 
sense that antitrust be defined narrowly to examine only those issues that 
are purely within antitrust’s ability to be measured and understood using 
industrial organization as the basis for economic analysis.  This technocratic 
approach moves noncompetition economic considerations to areas such as 
sector regulation, the legislative process, or executive fiat.  Such areas are 
better equipped than antitrust to deal with political trade-offs between law 
 
 35. For an overview of the regulatory state and its justifications, see BARAK Y. ORBACH, 
REGULATION:  WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES (2012); W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2005); Barak Orbach, What Is 
Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1 (2012), http://yale-jreg.org/what-is-regulation/. 
 36. See Fred S. McChesney et al., Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32 (providing an 
analysis of domestic public choice issues); D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of 
Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1041–48 (2011) (providing an overview of 
international antitrust public choice issues).  On public choice more generally, see DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003). 
 37. See Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law, in THE 
GOALS OF COMPETITIVE LAW 3, 5 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012). See generally, LOUIS KAPLOW 
& STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
 38. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That 
Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 133–35 (2009) (discussing public 
interest goals of sector regulation and how they might clash with antitrust based analysis). 
 39. Generally, technocracy is a school of thought that governmental powers, especially 
regulation, should be in the hands of industry experts and problem solvers. See Daniel A. 
Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2008).  Antitrust 
technocracy is more prevalent in the United States. See id.  In Europe, “technocracy” seems 
to be riddled with political trade-offs. See Chris Townley, Inter-generational Impacts in 
Competition Analysis:  Remembering Those Not Yet Born, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 
580 (2011); Chris Townley, Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?:  Public Policy and 
Its Discontents, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 441 (2011). 
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and policy because of their ability to deal with conflicting policy issues, 
whether based on legitimate goals or rent seeking. 
There has been, and continues to be, convergence around the use of 
industrial organization/competition economics as the basis for the analysis 
of competition law/antitrust.40  We believe that it is merely a matter of time 
until all of the major established antitrust regimes come to a point in their 
institutional and case law development in which the only choices among the 
goals of antitrust will be industrial organization based goals of total and 
consumer welfare.41  Essentially, nonindustrial organization economic goals 
and political goals will be pushed so far to the margin as to become 
inconsequential.  Developments to date suggest that this movement has not 
been uniform, but the trend in many countries suggests that this is in fact 
what is occurring. 
B.  U.S. Goals 
In the United States, several goals have defined antitrust law as it has 
developed, from those of the Sherman Act42 to the goals contained in 
current case law and agency thinking.43  Over time the discussion of the 
goals of antitrust has shed its overtly political elements in favor of goals 
that are based on different economic welfare standards, largely as a result of 
the Chicago Revolution.44 
U.S. competition law enforcement and the institutions that support it are 
evolutionary.45  The evolution occurs along a number of dimensions, such 
as shifts in judicial interpretation, economic thinking, and government 
 
 40. See, e.g., ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, INT’L COMPETITION 
NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013); ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Grp., Dominance/Substantial 
Market Power Analysis Pursuant to Unilateral Conduct Laws, INT’L COMPETITION 
NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc317.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 41. However, it remains unclear whether different antitrust systems will choose total 
welfare, the policy choice we believe to be superior.  This is the subject for a different 
article. 
 42. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 53–99 (1965); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN 
AMERICA:  HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 15 (1996); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY:  ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1955); Thomas J. 
DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust:  An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 73, 75 (1985); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-
examined, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 263, 273–74 (1992); Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to 
the Antitrust Movement?, reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT:  THE 
FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 20, 23–24 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991); George J. Stigler, 
The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5 (1985). 
 43. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago:  Which Antitrust School Drives 
Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 59 (2007); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond:  Time To Let Go of the 
20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147 (2012). 
 44. See BORK, supra note 1.  
 45. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
(2005). 
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policies and priorities.46  As the antitrust statutes are purposely vague, 
courts have developed and refined antitrust jurisprudence through the 
common law47 and have increasingly used economic analysis to drive this 
refinement. 
The judiciary is a key player in the U.S. antitrust system through its 
review of antitrust cases.  By reviewing agency actions, the judiciary has 
power to ensure that legal actions are upheld and enforced through 
injunctive relief, disgorgement, and financial penalties.  The more recent 
focus on economics has reduced the areas of per se illegality and increased 
the areas where the rule of reason operates because of procompetitive 
justifications for the business behavior.48  A similar move has been 
underway in the merger control area.49 
With a shift to the rule of reason, courts now provide more in-depth 
analysis.  But even these courts have failed to understand how critical the 
welfare standard is in this analysis.50  Thus, given the welfare standard, 
courts (including the Supreme Court) remain confused as to how to 
implement the rule of reason.51  This confusion creates circumstances in 
which the use of a different welfare standard might lead to a divergent 
outcome as between total and consumer welfare. 
As a result of shifts in agencies and courts, sophisticated economic 
analysis is now at the forefront of antitrust in the United States.52  Perhaps 
 
 46. DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
(2011); Sokol, supra note 15. 
 47. See generally William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, 
and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1982); William E. 
Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003); William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy:  A 
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000). 
 48. See Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 43, at 152–53 (“One result of the incorporation 
of economics into antitrust law has been the widespread rejection of broad rules of per se 
illegality.”). 
 49. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization:  The Role of Merger Guidelines 
in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006). 
 50. The prohibitions in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act appear to be both 
categorical and uncompromising.  “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy” that restrains trade appears to be condemned under section 1. 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  “Every person” who monopolizes a market appears doomed by 
section 2. Id. § 2.  But the Supreme Court soon recognized that a literal interpretation of the 
statutory language was both unwise and unworkable.  The test of illegality quickly centered 
on “reasonableness.”  In United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 558–60 (1898), a 
section 1 case, and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1911), a section 2 
case, the Court found only unreasonable restraints or business practices to be unlawful under 
the Sherman Act.  This, of course, raises the obvious question of how reasonableness should 
be determined; that is, what benchmarks or standards should be used to distinguish the 
reasonable from the unreasonable?  For the contemporary analysis of the rule of reason, see, 
for example, Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization:  The 
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012). 
 51. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 4, at 474–81. 
 52. Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization:  A Progress 
Report, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 152 (2010) (“Thirty years ago, it was common for antitrust 
arguments to rest on simple summary measures of industry structure such as concentration 
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unique among legal fields, antitrust is one in which the Supreme Court 
regularly cites not merely to law journal articles that employ economic 
analysis but to economics journal articles.  In its 2007 Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision,53 the Supreme Court cited to 
an economic textbook and articles from the Journal of Law and Economics, 
RAND Journal of Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the 
Journal of Political Economy.54 
One anecdote illustrates the change within the United States perhaps 
better than any other.  When Richard Posner wrote his antitrust book in 
1976, its title reflected the tension within antitrust legal scholarship and 
policy of the time.  Its title was Antitrust Law:  An Economic Perspective.55  
This was a provocative title.  As one prominent scholar wrote in his review 
of the book, “[Posner’s Antitrust Law] comes at a time when the limits of 
traditional microeconomics as a tool of antitrust policy have become starkly 
apparent, limitations which suggest that antitrust law should be moving 
outside the economist’s world rather than burrowing more deeply into it.”56  
By the time of the second edition in 2001, Posner’s title had been abridged 
to Antitrust Law.57  The economic revolution was so complete that all 
antitrust analysis has become economics based,58 and it was superfluous to 
mention the economic perspective in the title.59 
The change in discourse to one based on economics has framed antitrust 
scholarship such that any goal other than total welfare must be framed 
within an economic analysis lens.  Many of those who embrace a consumer 
welfare standard may do so based on their broad reading of the multiple 
 
ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices.  Nowadays, the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission, which are tasked with reviewing proposed mergers, commonly 
undertake sophisticated econometric studies to define industry boundaries and to assess the 
likelihood of price increases or collusive behavior following a merger.  These exercises often 
draw on academic research, and in turn have motivated the development of new empirical 
models.”); Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733 (2011) (providing empirical support of the shift to 
economic analysis); Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
429, 439 (2012) (“The evolution of antitrust has been shaped by changing lines of economic 
thinking and ideologies.”). 
 53. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 54. Id. at 890–92, 921. 
 55. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
 56. Harry First, Book Review, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 947 (1977). 
 57. See POSNER, supra note 6. 
 58. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 58–59. 
 59. Indeed, Harry First adopted economic analysis of antitrust in his writing. See, e.g., 
Peter C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic Theory:  Topco’s Closer 
Look, in ANTITRUST STORIES 171 (Daniel A. Crane & Eleanor M. Fox eds., 2007); JOHN J. 
FLYNN, HARRY FIRST & DARREN BUSH, ANTITRUST:  STATUTES, TREATIES, REGULATIONS, 
GUIDELINES, POLICIES (2011); Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-framing Windows:  The 
Durable Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641; Harry First, 
The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127 (2009); First & Waller, supra 
note 9. 
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goals of antitrust.60  From its inception, there were numerous goals of the 
Sherman Act.  As noneconomic goals of antitrust have been removed from 
the U.S. discussion as a result of the ascendancy of the Chicago School, the 
ideological fight over promotion of economic goals versus other goals has 
given way to a debate about different economic conceptualizations of 
welfare effects that approximate the more “populist” notions of competition 
within an economics framework.  In this current populist formulation, it is 
consumer welfare that would be maximized at the expense of producer-and-
consumer welfare. 
C.  E.U. Goals 
There is a rich literature of the goals of European competition law.61  
Though in the space of this Article we cannot do justice to various 
approaches suggested, for purposes of this Article we do not need to.  We 
merely note that there is a difference in how competition law has been 
conceptualized in Europe (and we exclusively deal with the E.U. level 
rather than at the level of national competition authorities) and the various 
goals to which competition law has been and continues to be applied.  We 
 
 60. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:  Efficiency, 
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987); John B. 
Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:  Protecting Consumers, 
Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008); Robert Pitofsky, Past, 
Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 209, 217 (2005); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus As the Appropriate Standard 
for Antitrust Enforcement, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205 (2007); Steven C. Salop, 
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 
73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329–33 (2006); Steven C. Salop, Question:  What Is the Real and 
Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?  Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 
22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010). 
 61. See, e.g., GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER:  THE DILEMMA 
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE HISTORY OF THE MARKET (1997); RENATO NAZZINI, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW:  THE OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES OF 
ARTICLE 102 (2012); CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND PUBLIC POLICY (2009); 
BEN VAN ROMPUY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY:  THE SOLE CONCERN OF MODERN ANTITRUST 
POLICY?  THE ROLE OF NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU (2012); 
Christian Ahlborn & Carsten Grave, Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism:  An Introduction 
from a Consumer Welfare Perspective, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 197 (2006); Eleanor M. 
Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 149 
(2003); Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer 
Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 EC, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 329 (2007); James 
Kavanagh et al., Reform of Article 82 EC—Can the Law and the Economics Be Reconciled?, 
in ARTICLE 82 EC:  REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION 3 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009); 
Frank Maier-Rigaud, On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law:  Efficiency, 
Political Freedom, and the Freedom To Compete, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW, 
supra note 37; Giorgio Monti, Article 82 EC and New Economy Markets, in COMPETITION, 
REGULATION, AND THE NEW ECONOMY 17, 40 (Cosmo Graham & Fiona Smith eds., 2004); 
Alberto Pera, Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and EC Antitrust Law, 
4 EUR. COMPETITION J. 127 (2008); Heike Schweitzer, Parallels and Differences in the 
Attitudes Towards Single-Firm Conduct:  What Are the Reasons?  The History, 
Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007:  A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, at 119 
(Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008). 
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provide a basic overview merely, first, to set up our discussion of how 
different goals may have an international dimension when goals are not 
aligned and, second, to note what seems to be an increasing (though still 
somewhat nascent) shift to a true consumer welfare standard.62 
Unlike in the United States, the divide in Europe has not been between 
total welfare and consumer welfare.63  Instead, the divide is between 
different visions of competition—one based exclusively upon industrial 
organization economics versus a mix of industrial organization economics 
and noneconomic political goals.  The latter mix encompasses an industrial 
policy that favored European over non-European firms64 and a focus on 
“fairness” that includes competitor effects and consumer choice.65  E.U. 
competition law is one of a number of competing goals under the treaty and 
these are bound together by the single market imperative.66  It was also 
influenced by the Ordo-Liberal tradition.67 
Although there is no explicit discussion of the goals of antitrust within 
the current Treaty Establishing the European Community or its 
predecessors,68 the Lisbon Treaty overall has certain goals, such as a 
unified market, that at times work within a traditional competition 
economics analysis for antitrust goals but at other times might lead to a 
divergence.69  Some of these important factors suggest a focus other than 
consumer welfare.70  However, since the E.U. competition system has been 
modernized to reflect, among other things, an analysis more heavily based 
on economics, the focus increasingly has been on consumer welfare,71 even 
 
 62. Bork sowed significant confusion with his use of “consumer welfare,” which in his 
formulation was not consumer welfare at all but total welfare. See BORK, supra note 1, at 
81–115. 
 63. But see NAZZINI, supra note 61, at 102 (arguing that dominance in Europe is based 
on a total welfare goal). 
 64. Nihat Aktas et al., Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation:  A 
Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis (Nov. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961188. 
 65. See TFEU pmbl.; see also id. arts. 119–120.  For academic commentary, see AMATO, 
supra note 61, at 2 (discussing consumer choice) and DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND 
COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:  PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 37–38 (1998) 
(discussing the ordoliberal tradition and fairness).  There is a certain similarity between these 
conceptualizations and that of U.S. cases that have now been discredited such as Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 66. This is reflected in the fact export bans (i.e., preventing a distributor in one member 
state from selling to customers in another) are treated as an ‘object’ agreement (as serious as 
price fixing). 
 67. Nicola Giocoli, Competition vs. Property Rights:  American Antitrust Law, the 
Freiburg School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5 J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. 747 (2009). 
 68. Laura Parret, The Multiple Personalities of EU Competition Law, in THE GOALS OF 
COMPETITION LAW, supra note 37, at 61, 63. 
 69. GERBER, supra note 65; VAN ROMPUY, supra note 61. 
 70. Parret, supra note 68, at 64–74. 
 71. For a general discussion, see PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE IN EU 
COMPETITION LAW:  LAW AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES (2012).  For a discussion on both 
procedural and substantive modernization, see David J. Gerber, Two Forms of 
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if some suggest that a consumer welfare rationale within European 
competition law might be at odds with the European Community Treaty.72 
To the extent that the case law is shifting (as opposed to agency 
decisions, guidelines, and discussion papers), the move to a serious 
economic analysis is still at an early stage.  To our knowledge, the first time 
that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ever used the term “consumer 
welfare” was in its Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet ruling of 
2012.73  While Pinar Akman’s impressive work argues that total welfare 
was closer to what the drafters had in mind when they drafted the Treaty 
provisions,74 this interpretation of the goal of European competition law 
remains a minority position.75  It also seems not to have been adopted by 
E.U. case law.  Rather, most court decisions formulate the goals of E.U. 
competition law differently.  In GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission,76 
the ECJ noted: 
62.  With respect to the Court of First Instance’s statement that, while it is 
accepted that an agreement intended to limit parallel trade must in 
principle be considered to have as its object the restriction of competition, 
that applies in so far as it may be presumed to deprive final consumers of 
the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price, the 
Court notes that neither the wording of [Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) 101(1)] nor the case-law lend support to such a 
position. 
63.  First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only 
those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may 
have an anti-competitive object.  Secondly, it must be borne in mind that 
the Court has held that, like other competition rules laid down in the 
Treaty, [TFEU 101] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors 
or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, 
competition as such.  Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has 
an anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be 
deprived of the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or 
price. 
 
Modernization in European Competition Law, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1235, 1256, 1263 
(2008). 
 72. David J. Gerber, The Future of Article 82:  Dissecting the Conflict, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007:  A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, supra note 61, at 
37, 46–49. 
 73. Case C-209/10, 2012 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2559, ¶ 42 (Mar. 27, 2012) (“[I]t is for 
the dominant undertaking to show that the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct 
under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on competition and consumer 
welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about 
as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains 
in efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most 
existing sources of actual or potential competition.” (emphasis added)). 
 74. Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 267 (2009). 
 75. DAMIEN GERADIN ET AL., EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 21 (2012) (“[This 
approach] finds no clear-cut support in the wording of the Treaty . . . .”). 
 76. Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P & C-519/06 P, 2009 E.C.R. I-
9291. 
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64.  It follows that, by requiring proof that the agreement entails 
disadvantages for final consumers as a prerequisite for a finding of anti-
competitive object and by not finding that that agreement had such an 
object, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law.77 
A broader review of case law suggests multiple goals, both economics 
based and noneconomics based. 
The T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit decision78 provides another recent formulation of 
the multiple goals of European competition law.  It states, “[TFEU 101], 
like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only 
the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to 
protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such.”79  In 
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB,80 the court explained in the 
dominance context:  
Article 102 TFEU is one of the competition rules referred to in 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU which are necessary for the functioning of 
that internal market.  The function of those rules is precisely to 
prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the 
public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby 
ensuring the well-being of the European Union.81   
Similarly, in the dominance context, the court has explained that “[TFEU 
102] thus refers not only to practices which may cause damage to 
consumers directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through 
their impact on competition.”82  This formulation seems to show concern 
for competitors, consumers, and the functioning of the internal market.  
These goals may at times be at odds with each other. 
The ECJ has taken similar positions regarding multiple goals in Sot. 
Lelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton83 and 
T-Mobile Netherlands.84  Some of the recent case law in the Article 102 
TFEU context suggests the protection of rivalry as a value in itself.  These 
cases include Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB85 and Visa 
Europe & Visa International Service v. Commission.86  The move within 
E.U. courts now seems at times even more expansive.  Decisions emphasize 
that the purpose of E.U. competition law is “to prevent competition being 
distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and 
consumers,”87 thereby ensuring the “well-being of the European Union” 
 
 77. Id. ¶¶ 62–64 (citations omitted). 
 78. Case C-8/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529. 
 79. Id. ¶ 38. 
 80. Case C-52/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
 82. Case C-280/08, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-09555, ¶ 176. 
 83. Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, 2008 E.C.R. 7139. 
 84. Case C-8/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529. 
 85. Case C-52/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527. 
 86. Case T-461/07, 2011 E.C.R. II-01729. 
 87. Case C-52/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527, ¶ 22. 
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both in TFEU 101 and TFEU 102 contexts.  Whatever the mix of these 
multiple goals, it is certainly not total welfare and not even clearly 
consumer welfare. 
Where there has been a noticeable change to embrace consumer welfare, 
it has been from EC’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG 
Competition) itself.  Its Merger Guidelines make explicit the goal of 
consumer welfare.88  The Commission similarly did so in its Article 82 
Guidance.89  Overall, the shift towards consumer welfare exists both at the 
level of top management90 and from the work product of the DG 
Competition itself.91  It may very well just be a matter of time before 
European courts embrace what is a clear attempt by DG Competition to 
refine and narrow the goals of competition to the singular purpose of 
consumer welfare.  This same trend should shift, with time, convergence 
among the national competition authorities toward the DG Competition 
formulation of welfare goals. 
D.  Convergence of Economics in Antitrust Law 
Even though a convergence of U.S. and E.U. case law towards a unified 
economic-based standard remains distant, this divergence is not the case in 
the academy, which has moved closer since the 1970s.  The “A” 
publications for European industrial organization economists are the same 
for U.S. equivalents.  Faculties attend the same conferences, write joint 
papers, and teach together.  The most important revolution in industrial 
organization in the past thirty years has been the game theory revolution.  
From this standpoint, it is interesting to note the fact that Jean Tirole 
originally wrote his textbook—the standard graduate level economic 
textbook around the world—in French rather than English.92  Thus, to a 
certain extent, economic analysis of antitrust has already converged.93  
 
 88. EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU COMPETITION LAW:  RULES APPLICABLE TO MERGER 
CONTROL 184 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/
merger_compilation.pdf. 
 89. Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 
9–10, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:
0007:0020:EN:PDF. 
 90. Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition, European Competition Policy—
Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices, Speech at the European Consumer and 
Competition Day (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-05-512_en.pdf (“[A]im is simple:  to protect competition in the market as a means 
of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.”). 
 91. Damien J. Neven, Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe, 21 ECON. POL’Y 
741 (2006). 
 92. JEAN TIROLE, CONCURRENCE IMPARTAIT (1985), translated in JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).  For a deeper discussion, see Daniel J. 
Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Antitrust Approaches to Dynamically Competitive Industries in 
the United States and the European Union, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 695, 715–23 
(2011). 
 93. This is true not only in Europe and the United States but elsewhere such as Australia, 
Canada, Chile, China, Israel, Korea, and Japan, to name just a few other jurisdictions. See, 
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Where there are differences, they seem to be at the margin—although hotly 
contested in these areas.94 
Differences remain in the use of economic analysis within the legal 
scholarship across the Atlantic.  First, the publication outlets are different in 
the United States than in Europe.  Second, economic analysis of law within 
this field seems to be, on the whole (with some notable exceptions), less 
used in Europe as European competition law scholarship is far more 
doctrinal.95  The way in which law is taught contributes to this.  There is far 
less economic analysis of the cases in the leading European competition law 
casebooks than in their U.S. antitrust law counterparts.  Indeed, every single 
major U.S. casebook has a Ph.D. economist among the casebook authors.96  
This development is not unique to the field of antitrust/competition law.  
Europe in general has been less receptive than the United States to the 
economic analysis of law among law professors, although in Europe 
economic analysis of law is more significant among economists.97 
A snapshot of the current European law reviews provides evidence of the 
different approaches to economic analysis of antitrust/competition law.  We 
compared the articles from the August 2012 issues of the European 
Competition Journal98 and the Antitrust Law Journal.99  Of six articles and 
a book review in the European Competition Journal, three articles reference 
an economics journal in the footnotes and two of those articles have 
economists as the author or coauthor. Of the remaining articles, only one 
article referenced any economics journals.  Compare this to the Antitrust 
 
e.g., Leonardo J. Basso & Thomas W. Ross, Measuring the True Harm from Price-Fixing to 
Both Direct and Indirect Purchasers, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 895 (2010); Joshua S. Gans & 
Stephen P. King, Paying for Loyalty:  Product Bundling in Oligopoly, 54 J. INDUS. ECON. 43 
(2006); David Gilo et al., Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion, 37 RAND J. ECON. 
81 (2006); Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, Abuse of Market Dominance Under China’s 2007 Anti-
monopoly Law:  A Preliminary Assessment, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 77 (2012); Ki-Eun Rhee, 
Collusion in the Presence of Externalities, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 475 (2007); Ken-Ichi 
Shimomura & Jacques-François Thisse, Competition Among the Big and the Small, 43 
RAND J. ECON. 329 (2012); Ralph A. Winter, Colluding on Relative Prices, 28 RAND J. 
ECON. 359 (1997). 
 94. See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32 
(providing a literature review and discussions of convergence and divergence across a 
number of different areas of antitrust economics). 
 95. Neven, supra note 91. 
 96. E.g., PHILIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES (6th ed. 
2004); ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:  CASES, CONCEPTS AND 
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (2d ed. 2008); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN ET AL., ANTITRUST 
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURES:  CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (6th ed. 2009). 
 97. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation:  The Economic 
Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602 (2006); 
Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation:  Law and Economics in 
Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555 (2008); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic 
Analysis of “Law & Economics,” 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 787 (2007). 
 98. See European Competition Journal, INGENTACONNECT, http://www.ingentaconnect
.com/content/hart/ecj/2012/00000008/00000002 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 99. See Antitrust Law Journal Archive, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/
tools/digitalassetabstract.html/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_law_journal/at_journal_
v78i1_full.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
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Law Journal, in which ten of eleven articles cited at least several economics 
papers, and the one article that did not reference an economics article was a 
short afterword that summed up most of the other articles. 
The lack of significant economic analysis within European law schools 
means that the pipeline of both ideas and practitioners of economic analysis 
in competition law is weaker in Europe than it is in the United States.  In 
the United States, it was the law-and-economics academy that first 
transformed the analysis of antitrust, starting in the 1950s.100  The courts 
followed, responding to the emerging scholarship.  Courts began to shift 
antitrust doctrine from per se to rule of reason (and greater economic 
analysis) starting in the late 1970s, while at the same time transforming 
procedural standards.101  These changes next influenced the antitrust 
agencies,102 which in turn further strengthened the changes within the 
courts.103  
In Europe, where the legal academy has not been the driver of economic 
analysis, the sequence has been different.  It has been DG Competition and 
the courts rather than the legal academy that have promoted greater use of 
economic analysis of antitrust in Europe.104  However, all is not lost 
regarding convergence of economic analysis of law.  Indeed, the trend is 
positive even within the European legal academy.  Additionally, 
practitioners have acted as catalysts of convergence in Europe.  Law firms 
and economic consulting firms have offices on both sides of the Atlantic 
and try to coordinate theories and analyses across antitrust agencies and 
before courts. 
International antitrust norms through international organizations such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and ICN support some legal convergence around economic analysis.  The 
dynamics of these organizations allow them to help foster convergence 
among countries around the world.105  Convergence within the international 
antitrust realm has tended to be stronger around procedural rather than 
substantive matters.  Nevertheless, in those substantive areas in which 
 
 100. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing 
Unilateral Practices:  A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005); Stephen 
Martin, Remembrance of Things Past:  Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of 
Industrial Economics, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST, supra note 12. 
 101. See Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 43; Kovacic, supra note 47. 
 102. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 229 (“More 
judges and lawyers learned the rudiments of antitrust economics, and antitrust economists 
became more effective as consultants and expert witnesses.  It is fair to say that at the 
beginning of its second century antitrust law has become a branch of applied economics, has 
achieved a high degree of rationality and predictability, and is a success story of which all 
branches of the law and allied disciplines can be proud.”); Richard A. Posner, Introduction 
to Baxter Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1007, 1007–09 (1999); Richard Schmalensee, Bill 
Baxter in the Antitrust Arena:  An Economist’s Appreciation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1317, 1323–
30 (1999). 
 103. Elhauge, supra note 43. 
104. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
105. See Oliver Budzinski, International Antitrust Institutions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32; Sokol, supra note 32. 
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convergence is possible, these organizations have helped foster 
convergence around best practices, which allows for integration within 
existing legal systems.106 
Is this convergence a good thing?  The answer is not straightforward.  
Convergence is not the same as uniformity.  Indeed, it would be naive to 
think that antitrust has reached an end of history in which every country 
interprets the same goal and applies it uniformly.  Competitive pressures do 
exist regarding ideas, and over time populist noncompetition economic 
theories of antitrust have dwindled and been moved to other areas of 
regulation across jurisdictions.  However, this has not led to a uniform 
standard, just as complex businesses themselves do not all share the same 
internal organizational structures.107  Antitrust will not reach a single global 
goal based on some sort of economic Darwinism where the marketplace of 
ideas will eventually lead to the total elimination of competing theories.108 
From an economic standpoint, convergence is positive if it leads to the 
same analytical economic approach across jurisdictions, since this provides 
for a certain level of predictability in both process and outcome.109  Without 
convergence, developments in Europe will affect business behavior in the 
United States.  However, convergence may be problematic if it leads to sub-
optimal enforcement or if there is convergence around a suboptimal 
standard.  Thus, convergence around a better substantive standard would 
allow for “trading up” and a race to the top, whereas bad standards would 
force some countries to trade down and create a race to the bottom with 
respect to regulatory standards.110 
Below, we explore two situations in which there is a divergence in the 
welfare standard for behavior between the United States and the European 
 
 106. John Fingleton, The International Competition Network:  Planning for the Second 
Decade, Address at the 9th Annual Conference in Istanbul, Turkey 4–5 (Apr. 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc617.pdf 
(“The ICN has proven successful in developing international best practices in relation to 
substantive standards, as we have seen in the areas of mergers and cartels, discussed above.  
Similarly, the ICN provides a forum to discuss differences, a ‘marketplace for ideas’.  The 
ICN has also provided part of the underlying infrastructure for many bilateral and regional 
improvements . . . .”). 
 107. See generally Richard R. Nelson, Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does it Matter?, 
12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 61 (1991). 
 108. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953) (providing a classic 
analysis). 
 109. See David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the 
Same Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 162 (2009) (“Divergence is hardly a happy 
state of affairs for companies that compete in multiple jurisdictions.  It is also a source of 
tension among competition authorities that are working from different rulebooks, as they 
jointly regulate the game of competition among firms playing on a world stage.”); Gifford & 
Kudrle, supra note 92, at 695. 
 110. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger 
Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423 
(2005).  These issues of regulatory convergence and the theories behind them play out across 
regulatory fields. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM:  RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); David Zaring, Rulemaking and 
Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2008). 
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Union and the implications of those divergences.  We begin with RPM and 
then examine merger efficiencies. 
II.  TREATMENT OF RPM 
There are some restraints that have been condemned under the antitrust 
laws despite having ambiguous welfare effects.  A prominent example is 
RPM, which is when a supplier sells its product to a distributor on the 
condition that the product not be resold below some specified minimum 
price.111  The difference between the U.S. and E.U. approaches regarding 
RPM has to do with the legal presumptions underlying each112—in the 
United States, RPM is not presumptively illegal while in Europe it is.  In 
the verticals setting, there is no global systemwide antitrust problem.  The 
least common denominator problem tends not to be as significant because a 
distribution strategy for end goods tends to be national. 
A.  U.S. Treatment 
It has been argued that RPM can be used to facilitate a horizontal 
conspiracy among manufacturers or among distributers.113  These cartels 
are clearly undesirable and should be condemned.  As price rises and 
quantity falls, both consumer welfare and social welfare may be reduced.  
Without some colorable claim of enhanced efficiency, the practice will have 
no redeeming virtue and will fail a rule of reason test.  But the existence of 
an RPM program is not evidence of a horizontal price fixing conspiracy 
among manufacturers or distributors. 
The U.S. Supreme Court found RPM to be illegal per se in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., a 1911 decision.114  After nearly 
100 years, the Court overturned Dr. Miles in its Leegin decision.115  The 
 
 111. Prohibitions on resales above a maximum price do not have ambiguous welfare 
effects.  Such restraints promote both consumer welfare and social welfare. See Roger D. 
Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan:  Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 123, 168–69 (1998).  This restraint is subject to the rule of reason. See 
generally State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997). 
 112. See Ulf Bernitz, Resale Price Maintenance in Comparative Perspective, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 441–50. 
 113. RPM supports a cartel by making it more difficult to cheat. Lester G. Telser, Why 
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 96–99 (1960) (explaining the 
cartel motivation for RPM and pointing out the weaknesses in those uses of RPM).  Herbert 
Hovenkamp examines the background of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 
and argues that there was a widespread conspiracy among distributors that explained the use 
of RPM in that case. See ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW:  1836–1937, at 342 (1991). 
 114. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  This decision has received a good deal of scholarly criticism 
that began long ago.  For an account of the early reactions, see William Breit, Resale Price 
Maintenance:  What Do Economists Know and When Did They Know It?, 147 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 72 (1991). 
 115. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).  There has 
been a wealth of commentary on this decision.  For a sampling, see Special Issue, Antitrust 
Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 271 (2010), 
available at http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/201007/ab-2010-55-
2-antitrust-bulletin-vol-55-no-2-summer-2010, as well as Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of 
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weight of scholarly research, as discussed in the Leegin opinion, revealed 
that RPM was neither invariably anticompetitive nor invariably 
procompetitive.  Consequently, a rule of reason analysis seemed necessary 
to determine whether a particular instance of RPM was lawful or unlawful.  
This is what Leegin now requires. 
B.  E.U. Treatment 
In theory, RPM is not per se illegal under Article 101.  However, it has 
been treated as such under the block exemption116 and so, in practice, it has 
the same effect as a per se violation under Article 101(1)117 (even though 
the 2010 block exemptions recognize for the first time some form of 
efficiencies argument under Article 101(3), which companies could in 
theory use).118 
The EC adopted its most recent vertical block exemption in 2010.119  A 
block exemption in relation to vertical agreements did exist before 2010.120  
What preceded that (pre-1999) was a messy system of individual 
exemptions (through a notification system) and an inefficient system of 
black and white listed clauses. 
Though the 2010 block exemption came out after Leegin, the EC took a 
different approach to RPM.  The block exemptions are more restrictive in 
some sense than U.S. measures.  Under the block exemption, no distinction 
is made between express RPM on the one hand and measures that may 
serve to influence RPM on the other.  Both are restricted where there is “a 
minimum or fixed sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives 
offered by, any of the parties.”121  Restricting both types of behavior is 
different from the approach used in the United States, where many price-
 
Antitrust and the Slow Death of Dr. Miles, 62 SMU L. REV. 437 (2009); Elhauge, supra note 
43; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust:  A New Approach to the Rule 
of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805.  As of this writing, there is pending 
legislation that would amend section 1 of the Sherman Act to overturn Leegin. See, e.g., 
Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3190; Michael A. Lindsay, From 
the Prairie to the Ocean:  More Developments in State RPM Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Aug. 
2012), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Upload/antitrust_lindsay_RPM_080712
.pdf. 
 116. Block exemptions allow for some level of safe harbor from competition law 
enforcement. ARIEL EZRACHI, EU COMPETITION LAW—AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO THE 
LEADING CASES 1 (3d ed. 2012) (“Agreements covered by block exemptions are presumed to 
fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) thus relieving the parties to these agreements 
from the burden under Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 of establishing that the agreement 
satisfies the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.”). 
 117. Commission Notice:  Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ¶ 223, SEC (2010) 411 final 
(Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Guidelines], available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf. 
 118. Id. ¶¶ 47, 223. 
 119. Commission Regulation 330/2010, on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and 
Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 1 [hereinafter Block Exemption]. 
 120. Commission Regulation 2790/1999/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21. 
 121. 2010 Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 226. 
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affecting measures, including RPM, are presumptively legal.122  The 
differences are not limited to price restraints but also include non-price 
restraints where Europe (but not the United States) has drawn distinctions in 
a number of areas, such as selective versus exclusive distribution123 and 
online versus brick-and-mortar sales.124 
One reason for the different treatment of vertical restraints in Europe may 
have been the historic and path dependent concern about market 
integration.125  This remains the case for the ECJ in its recent competition 
vertical rulings; noncompetition economic arguments regarding market 
integration trump all else in both Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC 
Leisure126 and GlaxoSmithKline.127  However, at the lower level, the 
General Court in its GlaxoSmithKline decision has been more open to 
competition economics based arguments,128 so perhaps over time a change 
might be possible in European case law. 
C.  Promotional Uses of RPM 
Several procompetitive motives have been offered for RPM.129  These 
uses of RPM are promotional in nature and are intended to cause the 
 
 122. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 
726 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); United 
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).  In Europe, vertical restraints outside of the 
price area are less permissive than in the United States.  These include lower market shares 
than the United States, which is more stringent with regards to territorial restraints. See 
FRANK WIJCKMANS & FILIP TUYTSCHAEVER, VERTICAL AGREEMENTS IN EU COMPETITION 
LAW (2d ed. 2011). 
 123. Block Exemption, supra note 119, art. I(1)(e). 
 124. 2010 Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 58. 
 125. Giocoli, supra note 67, at 779–80.  This is true not merely of vertical conduct but of 
vertical mergers as well. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem 
of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005) (discussing vertical conduct); Ilene Knable 
Gotts et al., Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of Reason:  The U.S./E.U. Treatment 
of Transatlantic Mergers, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 471–72 (2005) (discussing 
vertical mergers). 
 126. See Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08 (Feb. 3, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?docid=114111&mode=lst&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&
text=&doclang=EN&cid=1019182. 
 127. See Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P & C-519/06 P, 2009 E.C.R. I-
9291; see also Bernitz, supra note 112, at 441–50. 
 128. Case T-168/01, 2006 E.C.R. II-2969. 
 129. See Telser, supra note 113 (discussing the product-specific services theory of RPM).  
Marvel and McCafferty examined the role of RPM in protecting the investment of retailers 
that certify the quality of the products they carry. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, 
Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984).  
Springer and Frech examined the incentives retailers have for free riding on a manufacturer’s 
reputation to the detriment of consumers. Robert Springer & H.E. Frech III, Deterring 
Fraud:  The Rule of Resale Price Maintenance, 59 J. BUS. L. 433 (1986) (providing 
theoretical and empirical support for the beneficial use of RPM).  Ackert argues that the 
prestige associated with prestige goods stems at least in part from their price.  Consequently, 
that prestige can be lost through discounting, as consumers would begin to think of those 
goods as ordinary. See George R. Ackert, An Argument for Exempting Prestige Goods from 
the Per Se Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1995).  Generally, 
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demand function to shift rightward.  The increase in demand will increase 
the supplier’s profits, but it may also improve consumer welfare even 
though the price rises.  Under other circumstances, however, it will not 
increase consumer welfare and may even reduce total welfare. 
A clear case is illustrated in Figure 1, where D1 represents final good 
demand without any promotional services and the supply is represented by 
S1.  In Figure 1, we analyze a simple case of unit demand.  This is the case 
in which a consumer will buy only one unit of the good in question.130  In 
this case, the quantity sold also tells us how many consumers are in the 
market.  In the absence of promotional services provided by the distributors, 
the equilibrium price and quantity will be P1 and Q1, respectively.  Now, 
suppose that the manufacturer wants its distributors to provide promotional 
services that increase the demand for its product.  For many consumers, the 
promotions increase the value of the product.  Because the value of the 
product increases when these promotional services are performed, the 
demand shifts from D1 to D2.131  Of course, these promotions are costly 
and, therefore, the supply curve will shift from S1 to S2 to reflect the 
increased cost.  The new equilibrium is P2 and Q2.  In this case, the 
promotion not only leads to an increase in price from P1 to P2, but quantity 
also increases from Q1 to Q2 because the vertical shift in demand exceeded 
the vertical shift in supply.132   
In this case, consumer welfare is unambiguously enhanced.  Without the 
promotion, consumer welfare is given by the triangular area cdP1.  With 
those promotions, however, consumer welfare rises to area abP2.  This is 
clearly larger—and always will be—as long as the shift in demand is 
parallel and results in a quantity increase.133  Without promotion, producer 
welfare is given by the triangular area deP1.  With promotions, producer 
welfare increases to triangle bfP2.  This will also be larger as long as the 
shift in supply is parallel and results in an increase in quantity.  
Consequently, total welfare is given by the area of triangle cde without 
 
RPM is a means of correcting an incentive alignment problem.  This is highlighted in 
Richard E. Romano, Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance, 25 RAND J. 
ECON. 455 (1994). 
 130. This assumption of unit demand is not critical to our analysis, but facilitates some 
comparison of tradeoffs. 
 131. In Figure 5, we assume that D2 is parallel to D1, which means that every consumer 
places an equal value on the promotional services.  This, of course, may not be accurate; we 
deal with that possibility below. 
 132. If this were not the case, the manufacturer would not push the promotional services 
because it would not be profitable to do so.  The derived demand for the product by the 
dealers would fall rather than rise, and the manufacturer’s profits would suffer.  Frederic 
M. Scherer and David Ross point out that such services will be expanded until no further 
gains exist. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 541–48 (3d ed. 1990).  At this point, the increased cost of 
additional services will be precisely equal to the increased value of the product resulting 
from the increased services. 
 133. Triangles abP2 and cdP1 are similar because the corresponding angles are equal.  
Since the base of abP2 is larger than the base of cdP1, the area of the former must be larger 
than that of the latter.  This will always be the case with a parallel shift in demand. 
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promotion.  With promotion, total welfare expands to area abf.  In this 
context, RPM is used in a way that improves both consumer welfare and the 
manufacturer’s profits.  This use of RPM would be lawful under a rule of 
reason analysis regardless of whether the court is pursuing consumer 
welfare or social welfare. 
In the United States, the use of RPM depicted in Figure 1 would pass 
muster; but in the European Union it would not.  From an economic 
perspective, this is a curious result.  Consumers are clearly better off as a 
result of Q2 – Q1.  More people will consume the product; among 
consumers, no one is worse off.  Producer welfare also rises, so there is no 
loss there.  There are no losers, so a Kaldor-Hicks tradeoff is unnecessary. 
This raises an obvious question:  assuming that policymakers in the 
European Union understand the economic analysis, what goals are they 
pursuing?  It could very well be that because of the vertical guidelines, 
treatment of RPM may be framing the discussion in a way that it would not 
otherwise be if one were to create a new block exemption from scratch.  It 
also may be that the nonindustrial organization economics goals may play a 
larger role even in court cases.  Because of the historic harsh treatment of 
RPM, there is less empirical work in this area than other areas involving 
vertical restraints, but the work to date suggests that the European approach 
is not borne out by the economic evidence,134 and so European policy in 
this area seems to accept noneconomic goals. 
Below we show graphically the difference of outcomes across U.S. and 
E.U. systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134. For a discussion of the empirical RPM work to date, see Benjamin Klein, Online 
Resale Price Maintenance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS, supra note 32; Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Franchising and 
Exclusive Distribution:  Adaptation and Antitrust, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32. 
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Figure 1:  RPM Unambiguously Improves Both 
Consumer and Total Welfare 
 
In Figure 1, the parallel shift in demand from D1 to D2 indicates that all 
consumers value the promotion equally (i.e., each consumer’s willingness 
to pay increases by the same amount).  This, however, may not necessarily 
be the case, as all consumers may not value the promotions equally.135  In 
our economic model, this means that the shift in demand will not be 
parallel.  In Figure 2, the promotion leads to a rotation of demand from D1 
to D2.  We have constructed this example so that the increase in price from 
P1 to P2 and the increase in quantity from Q1 and Q2 in Figure 2 are 
precisely the same as the corresponding prices and quantities in Figure 1.  
In this case, consumer welfare without the promotion is equal to area acP1 
and with the promotion equal to area abP2.  In some cases (like the one 
depicted in Figure 2) consumer welfare will decline even though RPM is 
being used for promotional purposes.  In other cases, however, it will 
increase.136  Thus, the impact on consumer welfare is ambiguous on a priori 
 
 135. The economic consequences for consumer welfare were developed independently by 
William S. Comanor and F.M. Scherer. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, 
Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); 
F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983). 
 136. As a result, the appropriate antitrust policy is unclear. See Roger D. Blair & James 
M. Fesmire, The Resale Price Maintenance Policy Dilemma, 60 S. ECON. J. 1043 (1994).  
Richard Posner does not believe that this refinement can be handled in a judicial setting and, 
therefore, should be ignored. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 176.  Judge Posner may be right 
as a practical matter, but ignoring this refinement necessarily abandons the consumer welfare 
standard. 
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grounds.  As a result, the effect of RPM on consumer welfare is an 
empirical matter.  For all practical purposes, however, estimating the effect 
of RPM on consumer welfare while controlling for all other influences is 
problematic at best. 
 
Figure 2:  RPM May Improve Total Welfare but Reduce Consumer Welfare 
 
 
In Figures 1 and 2, all of the corresponding prices and quantities are 
equal.  As a result, RPM can lead to identical price and quantity increases 
but different outcomes for consumer welfare.  In Figure 1, RPM is clearly 
reasonable because both consumer welfare and total welfare increase due to 
RPM and, therefore, is presumably lawful in the United States.  In contrast, 
the RPM plan depicted in Figure 2 is unreasonable in the sense that 
consumer welfare declines, but may not be unreasonable on total welfare 
grounds.  Consequently, it is crucial to have a clear antitrust goal:  
consumer welfare or total welfare.  Without such clarity, policy 
prescriptions are murky at best.  Producer welfare is the same in Figures 1 
and 2 since the relevant areas are the same in both figures.  Thus, the impact 
on social welfare depends on the impact on consumer welfare.  If RPM 
causes consumer welfare to rise, then total welfare rises and vice versa.  It is 
therefore critical to determine the effect of RPM-induced promotion on 
consumer welfare. 
Determining the economic effect of RPM on either consumer welfare or 
total welfare is complicated by the fact that there are no simple tests.  It is 
clear that neither an output test nor a price test provides an answer to the 
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question of reasonableness.  RPM is supposed to lead to higher prices, but 
higher prices alone do not tell us what happens to welfare.  As the results in 
Figures 1 and 2 show, somewhat surprisingly, an output test also fails to 
distinguish the effects on consumer welfare.  Thus, it will be necessary to 
embark on a difficult econometric journey to resolve the reasonableness 
inquiry.  It would seem that whoever bears the burden of proof will lose the 
battle. 
There is another circumstance that poses a severe challenge for the rule 
of reason.  Suppose that the producer introduced a new product and sold it 
to distributors subject to an RPM policy.  In that event, all we would know 
is the price and quantity associated with the RPM-induced promotion.  
There would be no information regarding the price and quantity that would 
have resulted in the absence of the RPM-induced promotion.  In that event, 
we could measure consumer welfare, at least in principle, with RPM and 
the promotion but not without the promotion.  Thus, a rule of reason 
analysis would be impossible, because there would be no way to determine 
the effect of RPM on consumer welfare. 
D.  The OTCs and RPM 
Online travel companies (OTCs), such as Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, 
Priceline, and Travelocity, provide information on flight schedules, airfares, 
hotel room rates, and car rentals.  In many respects, OTCs are travel agents 
that are open twenty-four hours a day and, therefore, offer a more 
convenient service than the traditional travel agent.  As OTCs have grown 
in importance, several legal issues have arisen.  For the most part, OTCs 
have attracted the attention of tax-starved states and municipalities over 
forgone tax revenues.137  Most recently, however, RPM issues have 
surfaced.138  These price restraints may receive different antitrust treatment 
in the United States and the European Union. 
Consumers may consult various OTCs when searching for hotel 
accommodations.  These sites provide information on availability and rates 
in the destination city.  The consumer may then contact the hotel’s 
reservation system and book a room for, say, one hundred dollars.  If the 
applicable tax rate were 12 percent, the consumer would pay one hundred 
and twelve dollars to the hotel, which would keep one hundred dollars and 
transmit twelve dollars to the taxing authority. 
The consumer could also book the room through the OTC.  The hotels 
provide discounts to the OTC of, say, 20 percent.  In our example, the OTC 
would pay eighty dollars for the room along with nine dollars and sixty 
cents (i.e. 12 percent of eighty dollars) in taxes.  The consumer would still 
pay one hundred and twelve dollars pursuant to an agreement between the 
 
 137. See James Mak, What Should Be the Appropriate Tax Base for OTCs’ Hotel Room 
Sales, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 775, 775–86 (2012). 
 138. See Benjamin Klein, Online Resale Price Maintenance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32 (discussing online RPM issues). 
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hotel and the OTC that the OTC will not undermine the hotel by competing 
with it through discounting.  On this booking, the OTC will earn a gross 
profit of twenty dollars through the discounted room rate and another two 
dollars and forty cents because it pays taxes of nine dollars and sixty cents 
while collecting one hundred and twelve dollars from the consumer.  This 
lost tax has been subject of much litigation.139 
For our purposes, however, we are interested in the agreement between 
the hotel and the OTC that the OTC will not use the discount to undercut 
the hotel’s reservation system.  In effect, the hotel sells the room to the 
OTC at a wholesale price on the condition that the OTC not resell the room 
below a specific price set by the hotel.  This, of course, is RPM.  There are 
several antitrust issues surrounding these business practices. 
First, the vertical agreements between a hotel and each of the OTCs 
appear to be bilateral.  That is, there is no evidence of agreement among 
various OTCs.  But may one infer agreement under the logic of Interstate 
Circuit, Inc. v. United States140 in the United States or Toshiba Corp. v. 
Commission in the European Union?141  Second, since the hotel is engaged 
in a form of dual distribution, is it unreasonable for the hotel to avoid 
competing with itself?  In other words, is it unreasonable as that term is 
used in the antitrust context to refrain from competing with the OTCs? 
As described above, the hotel is engaged in dual distribution.  It produces 
hotel accommodations for travelers and sells directly to the consumer.  It 
also sells hotel rooms through the OTCs.  In doing so, it hope to increase its 
occupancy rates.  But the hotel runs the risk of competing with itself, which 
it wants to avoid through an RPM agreement with the OTC.  This 
agreement clearly restrains the OTC’s ability to reduce the price to the 
consumer, but is that unreasonable?  Presumably, the hotel would argue 
that the OTC has reduced consumer search costs, which is a procompetitive 
benefit of the dual distribution.  It would also argue that it would abandon 
dual distribution if it could not protect itself with the RPM agreement.  This 
argument (or one similar) may persuade a jury that the RPM agreement is a 
reasonable restraint. 
Now, suppose that the hotel has similar agreements with all of the major 
OTCs.  As long as these agreements are truly bilateral, each agreement can 
 
 139. See Mak, supra note 137. 
 140. 306 U.S. 208, 221–28 (1939). 
 141. Case T-113/07, ¶ 82 (July 12, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?docid=107961&mode=lst&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doc
lang=EN&cid=1021087 (“[T]he Commission cannot be required to produce documents 
expressly attesting to contacts between the traders concerned.  The fragmentary and sporadic 
items of evidence which may be available to the Commission should, in any event, be 
capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant circumstances to be 
reconstituted.  The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be 
inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, can, in the 
absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement . . . .”); see 
also Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P & C-
219/00 P, Aalborg Portland A/S v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. I-123; Case C-199/92 P, Hüls AG 
v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4287. 
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be supported by the same claim of reasonableness.  To the extent that each 
OTC honors its agreement with the hotel, there will be no price competition 
among the OTCs.  This, however, should not undermine the reasonableness 
of the RPM agreements. 
Contrary to this hypothetical, however, suppose that there is an 
agreement among the OTCs not to compete with one another.  This would 
make these bilateral agreements a horizontal agreement that unreasonably 
denies consumers the benefits of price competition and should therefore be 
deemed unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.142 
Another complicating factor is that the major hotels that presumably 
compete with one another have similar RPM agreements with the OTCs.143  
This in itself is not indicative of horizontal collusion among the hotels but 
may suggest to some that there is a restraint on competition. 
E.  Recent Litigation Regarding RPM and OTCs 
In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has filed a 
Statement of Objections against IHG and others that challenges the RPM 
agreements that prevent OTCs from undercutting the hotel reservations 
systems.  These supposedly bilateral agreements will prevent price 
competition among the OTCs.144  There are complaints from smaller OTCs 
that the larger OTCs demand that the hotels prevent discounting.  This 
alone, however, is not suspicious.  After all, if a large OTC honors its 
bilateral agreement with a hotel, it necessarily will resent being undercut by 
another OTC that is not honoring a similar agreement. 
In the United States, a consumer class action has been filed alleging that 
the RPM agreement is rigorously enforced against smaller OTCs so that the 
larger OTCs do not face price competition.145  In essence, the complaint 
alleges a horizontal rather than a vertical restraint.  If such an agreement is 
proven, it will violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.  If, however, the RPM 
agreements between each OTC and each hotel are simply a collection of 
bilateral agreements, then the RPM agreements will have to be proven to be 
unreasonable. 
III.  MERGERS 
In this part, we give a historic overview of the development of merger 
enforcement in the United States and European Union and examine the 
legal context of merger efficiencies.  Thereafter, we provide an analysis of 
how a proposed merger might be impacted by disparate merger standards 
 
 142. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 143. Posner has found industry-wide use of RPM suspicious. POSNER, supra note 6, at 
67–68. 
 144. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, Statement of Objections against Booking.com, 
Expedia and Intercontinental Hotels Group (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.oft.gov
.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/65-12. 
 145. Class Action Complaint, Turik v. Expedia Inc., No. 12CV04365 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 
2012), 2012 WL 3568787. 
 2013] WELFARE STANDARDS 2527 
across major jurisdictions.  The difference in outcomes can be seen through 
the example of the use of efficiencies arguments in case law regarding 
mergers.  In both cases, the dominant approach seems to be consumer 
welfare in both the United States and the European Union. 
Oliver Williamson first identified the efficiency trade-off raised by 
merger-specific efficiencies that may accompany an increase in monopoly 
power postmerger.146  There are some instances in which a business 
practice improves efficiency (i.e., reduces costs of production and/or 
distribution).  The easy case is one in which the merger does not enhance 
market power.  As a result, cost savings from the merger will be passed on 
to some extent to consumers in the form of lower prices.  This case is easy 
because the merger increases both consumer welfare and total welfare. 
The more difficult case occurs when the improved efficiency 
accompanies increased market power postmerger that leads to a price 
increase above the previous level.  This situation creates a need to weigh the 
benefits of improved efficiency against the costs of allocative inefficiency, 
since this merger should be allowed on total welfare grounds but not on 
consumer welfare grounds.  Before we examine these cases, we provide a 
review of how merger analysis has developed. 
A.  Merger Goals, Efficiencies, and Antitrust Systems 
This section traces the development of merger control in the United 
States, the first antitrust system to create a robust merger-control regime 
that includes merger guidelines to shape practice before agencies and 
courts.  This section then examines the development of U.S. merger case 
law regarding efficiencies.  Thereafter, it undertakes a similar analysis 
regarding European merger-efficiencies case law before noting areas of 
divergence between the two systems.  Finally, the section explains the 
economics of how different welfare standards could lead to disparate 
outcomes in the decision to allow or block a merger and how this might 
have a global impact. 
1.  Historic Overview of U.S. Mergers 
Perhaps more than any other antitrust system, the United States’ 
experience with merger control has shown the most dramatic shift from the 
influence of overt political factors to sole primacy of industrial organization 
economics considerations.147  Antitrust case law began to reflect the shift 
 
 146. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
 147. For example, in the United States, even though the economic understanding of cases 
such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), is retrograde by today’s standards, 
agencies still cite to them when they want to block a merger.  The latest methods in 
industrial organization recommend the least amount possible of political intrusion specific to 
industrial organization economics into antitrust policy. See ULRICH SCHWALBE & DANIEL 
ZIMMER, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL (2009); Mats A. Bergman et 
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from political factors to industrial organization economics in the late 1970s, 
although the change specifically in merger case law lagged a bit relative to 
the abolition of per se rules regarding conduct.148  As Judge Ginsburg has 
noted in the case law development, 
Even in such cases where there is no consensus among economists, there 
is, nevertheless, virtually universal agreement among antitrust economists 
and lawyers alike, that the Court should answer questions of antitrust law 
with reference to economic competition—matters of consumer welfare 
and economic efficiency—rather than make political judgments about 
such economically irrelevant matters as the “freedom of traders,” or “the 
desirability of retaining ‘local control’ over industry and the protection of 
small businesses.”149 
Classic merger cases such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,150 United 
States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,151 and United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank152 would be decided quite differently both in approach and outcome 
today.  Moreover, changes in priorities became embedded not merely in the 
case law but also in the agencies with the rise in the importance of 
economics. 
The introduction of economically informed merger guidelines has created 
a framework to analyze mergers, and the approach of writing and 
operationalizing guidelines has been copied in many of the world’s 
jurisdictions.  The importance of the merger guidelines to antitrust merger 
and the use of various economic theories and approaches have been 
tremendous.  There has been an iterative process of tweaking the guidelines 
as the economics of the time have changed.  This has been true in the 
United States with each iteration of the merger guidelines—1968, 1982, 
1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010.153  This economic approach based upon the 
merger guidelines has become embedded within U.S. case law.154 
Scholars have quantified the shift of merger enforcement.  Indeed, there 
is much empirical literature examining the political economy of federal 
government antitrust enforcement.  Judge Posner first set the stage by 
examining data on the Department of Justice antitrust litigation.155  Others 
 
al., Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States, 36 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 305 (2010); Tomaso Duso et al., An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU 
Merger Policy Reform (WZB, Discussion Paper SP II 2010-16, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1721412. 
 148. See Greene, supra note 49. 
 149. Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 1967 to 2007, at 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2, 22 (2007) (quoting Albrecht v. Herald 
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315–16). 
 150. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 151. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 152. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 153. Sokol, supra note 15, at 1105–09. 
 154. See generally Greene, supra note 49. 
 155. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 
365, 402 (1970). 
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have since updated, revised, and extended his work.156  Collectively, the 
empirical evidence shows that (1) there is no consistent relationship 
between the party of the President and federal antitrust enforcement, and (2) 
the relationship between aggregate economic activity and federal antitrust 
case-activity is ambiguous—the typical finding being a weak-positive or no 
link.  Empirical work suggests that overt industrial organization economics 
based politics has, for the most part, become a nonissue in U.S. merger 
enforcement in recent decades (1990s onwards).  As Malcolm Coate states, 
“Populism was forced to a fringe position.”157  This is a change from earlier 
studies of U.S. merger control that examined the 1980s and suggested that 
there were noneconomic factors at play in merger control.158 
Examining even earlier merger enforcement, and given the current state 
of industrial organization economics, U.S. merger enforcement and case 
law from the 1950s and 1960s is an intellectual embarrassment.  The 
agency priorities and case law reflected the idea that big was bad and that 
the protection of competitors mattered more than some notion of 
efficiency.159  In a large sense, overt noneconomic political factors mattered 
most within antitrust merger analysis.160 
2.  E.U. Mergers Historic Overview 
Empirical work that analyzes the pre–“effects based” period of European 
merger enforcement shows that protectionism existed in merger control in 
terms of deals challenged.  The analyses show that DG Competition had a 
 
 156. Malcolm B. Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 
33 J.L. & ECON. 463, 481–82 (1990); Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & 
ECON. 329, 339 (1982); Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 
1955–1997:  An Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 94–95 (2000); Vivek Ghosal, 
Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
733, 736, 740, 759 (2011); John J. Siegfried, The Determinants of Antitrust Activity, 18 J.L. 
& ECON. 559, 561 (1975). 
 157. Malcolm B. Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush:  Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement at 
the Federal Trade Commission 19 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314924; see also Daniel A. Crane, Has 
the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 13 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/
65_Stan._L._Rev._Online_13.pdf. But see Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, 
Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT 
THE MARK, supra note 33, at 235, 248–51. 
 158. Malcolm B. Coate, A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy:  The Case of 
Mergers, 14 ECON. & POL. 1 (2002). 
 159. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 574–75 (1967); In re Foremost 
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962).  This approach was not limited to mergers, but 
also applied in the monopolization setting. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[G]reat industrial consolidations are inherently 
undesirable, regardless of their economic results.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain:  The Political Economy 
of the Non-interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 
605 (2010) (exploring the broader political bargain of antitrust); Robert Pitofsky, The 
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (providing a defense of 
noneconomic factors). 
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higher probability of intervention against non-European firms when there 
were European competitors in the same market.161  This supports the view 
that the welfare standard (at least at that time) was not a traditional 
consumer or total welfare standard but one that included non-antitrust 
economic factors. 
Things have changed in Europe.  Empirical work that focuses on more 
recent European merger control suggests that protection of European firms 
from non-European firms is no longer a factor within European level 
merger control.162  With time, European merger analysis has improved, as 
European merger law has increasingly featured economic analysis as a 
result of certain doctrinal and structural changes.163  Changes have included 
reform via the 2004 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,164 which made 
economic analysis a more vital part of merger analysis, case law 
developments (Airtours/First Choice,165 Schneider/Legrand,166 and Tetra 
Laval/Sidel167),168 and the creation within DG Competition of the chief 
economist position and an economics group that is not subservient to the 
legal team in its analysis.169 
 
 161. Nihat Aktas et al., Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?, 117 ECON. J. 1096, 
1117–18 (2007); Tomaso Duso et al., The Political Economy of European Merger Control:  
Evidence Using Stock Market Data, 50 J.L. & ECON. 455 (2007); Serdar Dinç & Isil Erel, 
Economic Nationalism in Mergers & Acquisitions (May 18, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://fisher.osu.edu/fin/faculty/erel/papers/Dinc_Erel_2012May18
.pdf.  On the use of financial stock market return event studies for competition policy, see 
Tomaso Duso et al., Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis?  A 
Comparison of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 186 (2010). 
 162. Nihat Aktas et al., Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation:  A 
Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
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Industrial Policy and European Merger Control—A Reassessment, in FORDHAM 
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2011). 
 163. Nicholas Levy, Evidentiary Issues in EU Merger Control, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE:  INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 
81 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2009); Orbach & Sokol, supra note 52, at 446. 
 164. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation 
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, 14. 
 165. Case IV/M.524, 2000 O.J. (L 93) 1, overruled by Case T-342/99, Airtours v. 
Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585. 
 166. Case COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1, overruled by Case T-310/01, Schneider 
Electric SA v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071. 
 167. Case COMP/M.2416, 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13, overruled by Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval 
BV v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381; Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, 2004 O.J. (L 
38) 1, overruled by Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4519. 
 168. See ULRICH SCHWALBE & DANIEL ZIMMER, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPEAN 
MERGER CONTROL (2009); Mark Leddy et al., Transatlantic Merger Control:  The Courts 
and the Agencies, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25, 42 (2010); Duso et al., supra note 147. 
 169. Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 
569 (2009).  A similar trend occurred earlier in the United States.  Oliver Williamson notes, 
“Taken together, the creation of the position of Special Economic Assistant and the decision 
to staff the evaluation section with young lawyers who bought into the idea that economic 
reasoning should be featured more prominently in antitrust enforcement were important 
‘organizational innovations.’  For those who were a part of this transition, these were 
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Since that time, the role of economics (and economists) has grown both 
within DG Competition and among economic experts who regularly appear 
before Commission staff.170  Yet, the earlier case law and institutional 
approaches have impacted the current structure and nature of merger 
enforcement in Europe in terms of state intervention.  Quantitative research 
supports that, at present, Europe is a stricter enforcer of merger regulation 
than the United States.171 
3.  Examples of Merger Divergence 
It has been quite some time since the substantive merger standard has 
mattered across regimes.  What we have seen overall is that after a period of 
substantive divergence in merger control as it relates (in part) to economic 
analysis,172 increasingly there is convergence between the United States and 
the European Union as to substantive analysis of mergers.173  Yet, a number 
of high profile cases regarding mergers that involved significant merger 
scrutiny over a decade ago demonstrated that the more stringent legal 
regime could have global consequences.  These included most notably 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,174 General Electric/Honeywell,175 and 
Oracle/PeopleSoft.176  In each of these three cases, had either the United 
States or the European Union blocked the merger, the deal would have had 
to be abandoned as a condition of closing.  Of these three deals, the one that 
created the greatest transatlantic rift was GE/Honeywell, which the United 
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www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/boeingsta.shtm (last modified June 24, 2011). 
 175. See Case COMP/M.2220, 2001, 2004 O.J. (L 48) 1, prohibition aff’d, Case T-
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http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/July/303at.htm. 
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COMP/M.3216, Oracle/PeopleSoft, 2004, 2005 O.J. (L 218). 
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States approved but the European Union blocked.177  The effect of the E.U. 
action was to block the deal globally. 178 
We will now review these mergers to demonstrate that a divergence in 
merger standards can have global results in a way that a divergence in RPM 
standards cannot.  We begin with a short review of GE/Honeywell.179   
The proposed GE/Honeywell deal received merger clearance in the 
United States but was blocked within Europe based on the theory of a 
bundling of GE’s engines with its financial services at a price that was 
below what its rivals could offer.  Third-party complaints drove much of the 
hostility of the EC but so did a path dependency based on political 
considerations on the view of competition in Europe.  European 
competition policy, at the time, was far more likely to be about the 
preservation of competitors than that of the United States.  Thus, even if 
there were not some overt public choice explanation for the strategic use of 
antitrust, institutional factors also pushed DG Competition to block the deal 
in Europe and, in effect, to block the deal globally.180 
In Oracle/PeopleSoft, the EC approved the merger but did so using the 
same unilateral effects theory that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) had 
suggested to block the deal.  Unlike Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and 
GE/Honeywell, the Europeans agreed with the market definition employed 
by DOJ and yet somehow still cleared the merger after DOJ had lost its 
merger challenge to the deal before a district court.  This is puzzling since, 
if DG Competition accepted the DOJ market definition, the three-to-two 
merger most probably should have been challenged by DG Competition 
based on a unilateral effects theory. 
Politics seems to have played a role in the decision not to challenge the 
Oracle/PeopleSoft merger in Europe.  Because of the very thorough opinion 
that would have made an appeal incredibly difficult to win, DOJ decided 
not to appeal the ruling.  Had economic analysis been at the forefront of the 
European decision making, this would have created a potential problem.  
By challenging a deal that could proceed in the United States, the EC would 
only increase transatlantic tensions, just as Commissioner Monti’s term was 
to come to a close and just as efforts on best practices in the ICN for merger 
control were taking shape. These political factors seem to have been in play 
in the EC’s decision to clear Oracle/PeopleSoft.  DOJ’s loss in the district 
court provided cover for the Europeans not to challenge the deal 
aggressively so that Commissioner Monti would not leave a political bomb 
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Stopped—A Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331 (Eleanor M. 
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for his successor Commissioner Kroes and another potential transatlantic 
rift.181 
Having described past divergence, we now examine the present and 
future use of efficiencies in merger law and economics and how there might 
be divergence between the United States and Europe.  With the political 
issues resolved and closer day-to-day coordination between U.S. and E.U. 
agencies, the type of political divergence between merger deals may be a 
thing of the past.  Consequently, we lay out a hypothetical merger based on 
purely economic factors that might lead to divergent outcomes. 
B.  U.S. Efficiencies in Merger Law 
Efficiencies in mergers went through a significant transformation over a 
period of thirty years between the 1960s and 1990s.  In the 1960s, 
efficiencies were treated with some hostility under U.S. case law.  In In re 
Foremost Dairies,182 a violation of section 7 of the Sherman Act would 
include a firm’s “over-all organization [that] gives it a decisive advantage in 
efficiency over its smaller rivals,”183 while in Philadelphia National 
Bank,184 the Supreme Court noted that “a merger the effect of which ‘may 
be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some 
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be 
deemed beneficial.”185  Technically, the Court has never renounced its 
earlier view on mergers efficiencies in its more modern antitrust 
jurisprudence, largely because there has not been a substantive merger case 
before the Court in over a generation. 
Though efficiencies arguments began to emerge as part of the rule of 
reason analysis in conduct cases, its adoption in earnest within the area of 
mergers came later.  Starting in the 1980s, the rewriting of the efficiencies 
analysis, as part of the 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, moved 
efficiencies from being a defense to part of the competitive effects.186  
Certain cases along the way, such as United States v. General Dynamics 
Corp.,187 also helped.188 
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This brief historic overview of merger efficiencies allows us to move to 
the present legal regime for merger analysis of efficiencies—the 2010 
Merger Guidelines,189 which for the most part adopted the 1997 version of 
the efficiencies section.190  What the language of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines suggests at first blush is an unambiguous support of a consumer 
welfare standard. 
Efficiencies are treated under a “sliding scale” approach.191  The 2010 
Merger Guidelines explain: 
The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of 
a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be 
anticompetitive in any relevant market.  To make the requisite 
determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies 
likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm 
customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in 
that market.  In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply 
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude 
of the likely harm to competition absent the efficiencies.  The greater the 
potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the 
cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to 
customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.192 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines add that “[i]n adhering to this approach, the 
Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition, not internal 
operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.”193  Courts have 
responded to this language by adopting a true consumer welfare standard 
with regard to efficiencies.194  Indeed, most of the litigated cases before the 
courts do not rest strongly on an efficiency argument, but this has not 
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stopped various courts in dicta from reiterating the importance of consumer 
welfare in the efficiencies context.195 
However, as the expression goes, the devil is in the details.  In our case, 
that detail is footnote fifteen of the efficiencies section of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines, which provides for the possibility of the use of a total welfare 
standard for merger efficiencies.196  In that footnote, the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines explain, “The Agencies also may consider the effects of 
cognizable efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the 
relevant market.”197  
This attention to detail also opens up the possibility of some ambiguity 
within case law as to what welfare standard might come into play regarding 
a case that substantively may be litigated upon efficiency grounds.  To date, 
there has been only one case in which there was a significant discussion of 
efficiencies under the modern Merger Guidelines, a merger known 
commonly as the “baby foods case” and officially as FTC v. H.J. Heinz 
Co.198  The case involved a proposed three-to-two merger between Heinz 
and Beech Nut, the number two and number three firms in the baby food 
market.199  The merging parties argued that the merged company would 
provide efficiencies to more effectively compete with the market leader, 
Gerber.200 
According to the D.C. Circuit in Heinz, to prove the case for accepting 
the efficiencies argument of the parties, given the high level of 
concentration of the merged firm, would require extraordinary efficiencies.  
However, the court did not make clear what it meant by extraordinary 
efficiencies.  From the standpoint of welfare standards, the court was also 
silent as to whether extraordinary efficiencies should be measured using 
consumer welfare or total welfare (the district court had been similarly 
silent as to the standard).  Unfortunately, the only guidance as to the welfare 
standard for extraordinary efficiencies comes in the form of dicta via a 
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citation to FTC v. University Health.201  The Heinz D.C. Circuit decision 
quoted the proposition in University Health that “a defendant who seeks to 
overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would substantially 
lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would 
result in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would 
benefit competition and, hence, consumers.”202  The problem with this 
statement is that it muddled what goal might be reached.  It could be that 
what might benefit competition (total welfare) may be at odds in some set 
of cases with what might benefit consumers (consumer welfare) in the 
situation of extraordinary efficiencies.203  One could imagine a hypothetical 
two-to-one firm merger in which prices might not fall, but the combined 
firm conducts research and development more efficiently.204  Under a total 
welfare standard, such a merger should be allowed even though under a 
consumer welfare standard the outcome might be more ambiguous.  In such 
circumstances, prices may go up for a number of years before going down 
many years later, if at all.205 
C.  E.U. Efficiencies in Merger Law 
Whereas E.U. competition law was a part of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
with regard to conduct, merger control at the E.U. level came about 
relatively late in 1989 with the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR), which went 
into effect in 1990.206  An amended ECMR went into effect first in 1998 
and then in its current form in 2004.207 
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The ECMR explicitly recognizes efficiencies as of the 2004 revisions.  It 
notes, “In order to determine the impact of a concentration on competition 
in the common market, it is appropriate to take account of any substantiated 
and likely efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned.”208  This 
is based upon “the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to the consumers’ advantage and does not form an 
obstacle to competition.”209  The EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines note 
that an efficiencies defense will work in situations where 
the Commission is in a position to conclude on the basis of sufficient 
evidence that the efficiencies generated by the merger are likely to 
enhance the ability and incentive of the merged entity to act pro-
competitively for the benefits of consumers, thereby counteracting the 
adverse effects on competition which the merger might otherwise 
have.210 
Furthermore, efficiencies must “benefit consumers.”211  As a result of the 
language from the ECMR and the Merger Guidelines, it seems to be the 
case that the welfare standard for an efficiencies defense in Europe is 
consumer welfare. 
European merger cases support this view of a consumer welfare standard.  
In Inco/Falconbridge,212 the EC rejected an efficiencies defense (although 
conditioned approval of the merger-based remedies proposed) because the 
efficiencies of the proposed merged firm would not be passed through to 
consumers.  Similarly, regarding Ryanair/Aer Lingus, the EC rejected an 
efficiencies defense in part because it believed that the efficiencies would 
not be passed on to consumers.213 In a more recent airlines case, 
Lufthansa/SN Airholding, the EC approved a merger but rejected the 
efficiencies defense because the efficiencies could not be passed through to 
consumers.214 
Adding an analytical twist to the European approach is that, unlike the 
United States,215 the European Union has relatively recent merger 
guidelines that apply in cases of conglomerate effects and vertical 
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mergers.216  These European nonhorizontal guidelines make clear that “the 
fact that rivals may be harmed because a merger creates efficiencies cannot 
in itself give rise to competition concerns.”217  Efficiencies seem to take a 
consumer welfare approach under these guidelines as well.218  In the Tom 
Tom/Tele Atlas case,219 the EC took a consumer welfare approach to 
efficiencies in a detailed discussion of efficiencies, even though the EC 
found that the efficiencies were irrelevant to the decision to approve since 
the deal did not present anticompetitive concerns.220 
D.  Economics of Merger Efficiencies 
Having discussed divergence in the case law, we move to an economic 
analysis of merger efficiencies and illustrate how a change in welfare 
standard might lead to divergent outcomes in the United States and the 
European Union.  Efficiency that flows as a result of a merger may justify 
mergers and joint ventures under antitrust law.  The Williamsonian tradeoff 
of merger specific efficiencies may lead to situations where the merged firm 
is able to pass on the merger specific cost savings to consumers.  However, 
the efficiency tradeoff may result in an increase of monopoly power.  In 
those circumstances in which the increase in market power still leads to 
lower prices, there is no antitrust problem regardless of the welfare standard 
used.  There will, however, be a problem in those situations in which the 
efficiencies enhance total welfare but reduce consumer welfare through 
higher prices. 
In Figure 3, the premerger price and quantity are represented as P1 and 
Q1.  What determines P1 and Q1 are the equality of demand (represented as 
D) and the competitive supply, which the figures shows as MC1 = AC1.  The 
model in the figure assumes that the industry’s marginal cost (represented 
as MC1) and average cost (represented as AC1) remain constant.  The 
merger will increase efficiency.  We reflect this as the decrease in costs 
from MC1 = AC1 to MC2 = AC2.  If market power due to the merger does not 
increase, the cost savings will be passed on to consumers.221  Postmerger, 
the price will fall to P2 and the quantity will rise from Q1 to Q2.  Under this 
scenario, the merger should not raise competition law concerns since the 
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welfare effects are positive—both consumer welfare and total welfare 
increase.222 
 
Figure 3:  Mergers Specific Efficiencies:  the Welfare Tradeoffs 
 
 
 
Under an alternative scenario, there is a merger in which market power 
increases as a result of an efficiency-enhancing merger.  In Figure 3, let us 
assume that the merger leads to the same cost savings as before.  However, 
unlike before, the exercise of the market power that results from the merger 
leads to an increase in price from P1 to P3.  This leads to a corresponding 
decrease in quantity from Q1 to Q3.  From a consumer welfare framework, 
the merger is undesirable.  The consumer has experienced an increase in the 
price paid.  Moreover, the consumer also does not appear to benefit from 
the cost reduction that has occurred as a result of the merger.  Figure 3 
measures this as the allocative inefficiency resulting from market power 
postmerger that causes consumer welfare to fall from area acP1 to area 
abP3.  If the lawfulness of the merger under the legal regime is determined 
solely on the basis of consumer welfare, the result is that in this market, the 
merger would be unlawful. 
Examining the same scenario but from the lens of total welfare, the 
lawfulness of the merger may be different.  Two issues arise in this context.  
 
 222. For a similar result, see MOTTA, supra note 6, at 261–62. 
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First, whether total welfare rises or falls depends on the relative magnitudes 
of the allocative inefficiency and the cost saving.  In Figure 3, we represent 
the allocative inefficiency by the triangular area bcd.  The postmerger profit 
to the sellers is equal to the rectangle P3beP2.  Part of this, area P3bdP1, is a 
transfer from consumers to producers, while rectangle P1deP2 represents the 
cost saving.  Given how Figure 3 has been drawn, the cost saving as a result 
of the merger appears to be larger than the allocative inefficiency from the 
merger.  When this is the result of a merger, the merger should be lawful 
under a system that follows a total welfare standard because the benefits of 
the cost saving outweigh the allocative inefficiency.  Indeed, from a Kaldor-
Hicks cost-benefit analysis, under this scenario the merger is efficient 
because the winners of the merger (the producers) would be able to 
compensate the losers of the merger (the consumers) and still be better 
off.223 
This possible outcome is not the only one that could arise after the 
merger.  There may be circumstances in which the allocative inefficiency 
will outweigh the postmerger cost saving.  Under such circumstances, the 
merger will reduce both consumer welfare and total welfare.  As a result, 
the joint venture will be inefficient on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion because it 
will not be possible for the winners of the merger (producers) to profitably 
compensate the losers of the merger (consumers).  Under both a total 
welfare and consumer welfare standard the merger should be unlawful and 
forbidden. 
Even if the welfare standard is exclusively consumer welfare, it is 
important to note that the cost savings of the merger described above 
benefit consumers generally.  It is the case that these cost savings will 
improve the sellers’ profits in this market.  However, an inference that 
would dismiss these cost savings as inconsequential to consumers would be 
mistaken.224  The costs of production that sellers face decrease as fewer of 
society’s scarce resources are needed to produce the output being sold.225  
Consequently, these resources are available to be redeployed to produce 
goods and services in other markets.  Even though the consumer benefits 
that flow from these cost savings may be diffused throughout the economy, 
they still exist.226 
This economic analysis shows that it is possible for a merger to be 
allowed under a total welfare standard but blocked under a consumer 
welfare standard.  If this merger is efficiency enhancing both domestically 
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and globally, it could still be blocked in Europe but not in the United States, 
given existing case law.  Thus, a merger that enhances total welfare globally 
may not go through (even if it is total welfare enhancing in each 
jurisdiction) because the welfare standards of the two antitrust powers differ 
with regard to merger efficiencies. 
CONCLUSION 
Divergence across goals of antitrust impact both antitrust law and policy.  
In the United States, goals of antitrust are exclusively economic ones.  In 
Europe, there are some political noneconomic goals in addition to economic 
goals.  Over time, E.U. case law and policy will recognize that the only 
goals that will impact antitrust are economic ones.  This seems to be the 
trend within DG Competition, although the courts and legal academics have 
not yet followed this trend as strongly.  However, the transition to 
exclusively economic goals across jurisdictions is not without peril.  
Welfare standards as between total welfare and consumer welfare are not 
always clear.  Moreover, the choice of welfare standards might lead to 
divergent outcomes both within a single antitrust system and across 
antitrust systems.  We demonstrate how such divergence plays out in the 
examples of RPM and merger efficiencies. 
In a best-case worldwide scenario, we believe that total welfare should 
guide antitrust.  However, when given the choice between political factors 
playing a role in antitrust analysis versus a standard of consumer welfare, 
we choose consumer welfare as a second best standard to bring economic 
clarity to the law and policy of antitrust globally. 
